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This paper is a response to Patrick Hart’s “Theory, Method, and Madness in Religious 
Studies,” and it argues that philosophy is presupposed and therefore ineliminable 
when theorizing religions.
I come to the academic study of religions as a philosopher, and I notice often 
that the relationship between the work of philosophy and that of the other 
disciplines in our field is poorly understood. Philosophers typically pursue 
normative questions. They seek to distinguish what is real from what merely 
appears real, views that one should hold from beliefs that are unjustified, and 
what is just from what is oppressive. A class on ethics, for example, seeks to dis-
tinguish what is morally right from what is merely prudent. But whether such 
normative questions fit in the academic study of religion—and, if so, how—is 
a topic that is murky and contested. I therefore read Patrick Hart’s insightful 
paper about the history of the concepts of “method” and “theory” with inter-
est. He helps me ask this question: how do the normative questions pursued 
by philosophers relate to the way that these two concepts are now understood 
in our field?
The answer, apparently, is that philosophy is accepted as a method, but 
does not clearly have a place when scholars theorize religion. This division is, 
I judge, an unhealthy arrangement.
Hart shows that philosophy has long been spoken of as a method. Plato and 
Aristotle both describe the practice of philosophy in this way (pp. 8-10). And 
Hart speaks for the general consensus that the academic study of religions is 
a polymethodical or multidisciplinary field that includes philosophy when he 
cites Russell McCutcheon, saying: “Scholars in the study of religion apply his-
torical, archaeological, linguistic, textual (e.g. philological, structural and semi-
otic), philosophical, sociological, psychological, ethnographic, anthropological 
and art historical methods” (pp. 13-14). More precisely speaking, we should 
refer to philosophy not as “a” method but rather as a set or a family of related 
methods. The pragmatic method in philosophy seeks to clarify conceptual dis-
agreements by turning attention to the experiential difference, if any, that can 
be found between two rival accounts. The deconstructive method takes mean-
ings that are unreflectively taken as real and seeks to reveal them as conceptual 
constructs, historically emergent and ideologically motivated. The phenome-
nological method seeks to bracket the scholar’s distorting assumptions in order 
to give an accurate description of the objects of experience. The genealogical 
method seeks to give an account of the constitution of knowledges or discourses, 
especially concerning those aspects of our lives (like sexuality or insanity) that 
are assumed to be historically stable. All of these philosophical methods, and 
others, have been put to use in the academic study of religions. Granted that 
there is disagreement within pragmatism and within each of these other 
movements about what its method properly is, and granted that some of 
these approaches have resisted being called a method, it is fair to say both 
(i) that philosophers often understand themselves as employing a method and 
(ii) that such methods have found a place in the academic study of religions.
One might expect that the same would true of the term “theory.” As Hart 
shows, Plato and Aristotle also described philosophy as theoretical, using the 
term to mean seeking true sight or knowledge of the nature of things. Certainly, 
contemporary philosophers use the term all the time: “Ethical Theory” and 
“Theories of Knowledge” are typical philosophy courses and textbooks.
But when one turns to theories of religion—whether in capstone courses 
or textbooks (or this journal!)—philosophers are found few and far between. 
None of the classical theorists of religion (Tylor, Frazer, Marett, Freud, Jung, 
Durkheim, Weber, Eliade, or Geertz) are philosophers. And the same is 
true of the contemporary theorists of religion (Berger, Bellah, Parsons, Stark 
and Bainbridge, J. Z. Smith, Tweed, Lincoln, Luhmann, or Vázquez). So, schol-
ars in the academic study of religion accept philosophy as one method (or 
set of methods) in the field—perhaps in its own self-imposed ghetto, “philoso-
phy of religion.” But when scholars theorize religion, apparently philosophy 
falls out.
This absence is clarified when Hart identifies the three kinds of “theory in 
religious studies” (pp. 19-20). The first kind of theorizing concerns the origin 
of religion. One sees this “grand” theorizing in Tylor’s speculation that reli-
gion emerged as an attempt to understand the apparitions of the deceased in 
dreams and the difference between an animated person and the dead body, 
or in Durkheim’s claim that religion began with the totemic apotheosis of 
society. The second kind of theorizing in religious studies seeks to provide an 
account that explains religious phenomena by pointing out their naturalistic 
causes. Most of the classical and contemporary theorists listed above fit this 
description. There are then critics of these two kinds of theories, critics like 
Tomoko Masuzawa who seek to critique or undermine those earlier theoreti-
cal projects. Using McCutcheon’s distinction between “theory-as-explanation” 
and “theory-as-critique,” Hart suggests that these critics are themselves offer-
ing a new explanatory theory, namely, one that seeks to explain not religion 
but “religion.” Whether or not Hart is right about this (and he is wrong to take 
McCutcheon as an ally on this point, since McCutcheon now distinguishes cri-
tique from theory [2013: 347]), one can see that none of these three approaches 
includes what philosophers typically do.
The danger here, to my mind, is that those who study religions will come to 
think that the normative questions pursued by philosophers are unscientific or 
acritical or confessional or “theological” in a pernicious sense, and that those 
questions therefore don’t belong in the academic study of religion. Moreover, 
the lack of philosophy in theorizing religion may spill over into method. Bruce 
Lincoln’s “Theses on Method” were first published in this journal almost 20 years 
ago and have since been widely reprinted. Hart says that Lincoln’s theses are 
not really about method for our field per se, but rather about historical method 
in particular (p. 15), and I think that he is right. But the broad title of Lincoln’s 
piece has probably given many the sense that the theses aim to articulate the 
ground rules for method in the academic study of religions as such. And the 
theses themselves suggest this when they speak of the virtues that define not 
just the historian, but any scholar (thesis 5) and identify conditions without 
which one fails to be a scholar at all (thesis 13). I find Lincoln’s view of the his-
torical method a bracing sketch of what critical explanation of religions should 
be, but I wonder whether the absence of philosophy in theories of religion 
now gives many of my colleagues the sense that the proper method in the aca-
demic study of religions also sets aside normative questions. As Lincoln once 
told me, in the academic study of religions, we do not tell students what is right 
or wrong.
My own view is that the academic study of religion cannot excise norma-
tive questions, and therefore the subject matter of philosophy cannot be 
 eliminated from the field. For example, what Hart calls theory-as-explanation 
rests upon views of what constitutes a real cause and what the human mind 
can know—typically views inherited from empiricist philosophers. What Hart 
calls theory-as-critique rests upon views of how language operates and how 
it relates to the world—typically views inherited from post-structuralist phi-
losophers. Marxist theory of religion presupposes Feuerbach’s philosophical 
anthropology. Critical theory of religion inherits Nietzsche’s hermeneutics 
of suspicion. Durkheim is a Kantian; Eliade gets religious being-in-the-world 
from Heidegger; and Geertz steals from Ricoeur and Wittgenstein. When schol-
ars theorize religion, they do so in ways that are dependent on the normative 
views on which philosophers critically reflect (for more on this, see Schilbrack 
2014: esp. ch. 7). In fact, when any scholars theorize anything, they presuppose 
answers to normative questions about what is real, true, moral, or just.
If I am right about the ineliminability of philosophy from theory, it does not 
follow that a capstone course in theories of religion needs to add a philosophi-
cal theory of religion to complement those of Freud, Marx, and Durkheim. 
But it does mean that the trend of thinking that the study of religions is reso-
lutely scientific or that it can operate without raising questions about values or 
reality is confused. I therefore hope that theory of religion in future capstone 
courses or textbooks (or this journal) treats theorizing in a way that acknowl-
edges and does not hide the fact that it always requires one to have answered 
normative questions.
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